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One of the challenges in practical quantum key distribution is dealing with efficiency mismatch
between different threshold single-photon detectors. There are known bounds for the secret key
rate for the BB84 protocol with detection-efficiency mismatch provided that the eavesdropper sends
no more than one photon to the legitimate receiver. Here we improve these bounds and give tight
bounds for the secret key rate with a constant detection-efficiency mismatch under the same single-
photon assumption. We propose a method based on the analytical minimization of the relative
entropy of coherence, which can be used in other problems in quantum key distribution. Also we
propose an adaptation of the decoy state method to proof the security in the case of weak coherent
pulses on the source side.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a way for two dis-
tant parties (Alice and Bob, the legitimate parties) to
establish a common secret key for confidential messag-
ing. Theoretically, the security of QKD is based solely
on the laws of quantum mechanics, i.e., does not depend
on the computational power or technical devices of an
eavesdropper (Eve). However, in practice QKD faces cer-
tain challenges caused by imperfect devices [1–3]. One of
such imperfections is efficiency mismatch between differ-
ent threshold single-photon detectors.
In the most common QKD protocol, Bennett and Bras-
sard 1984 (BB84), as well as in other discrete-variable
QKD protocols, information is typically encoded in the
polarization or phase of weak coherent pulses simulat-
ing true single-photon states. Hence, the corresponding
implementations employ single-photon detection tech-
niques. Ideally, a detector should click whenever it is
hit by at least one photon. However, a realistic detector
is triggered by a photon only with a certain probability
0 < η < 1, which is referred to as the efficiency of a detec-
tor. Typical value of η for the detectors used in practical
QKD systems (based on avalanche photodiodes) is 0.1.
The detectors based on superconductors have η ≈ 0.9,
but they are more expensive and require cryogenic tem-
peratures.
In this paper we will consider the BB84 protocol with
the active basis choice. In this case, Bob uses two de-
tectors: One for the signals encoding bit 0 and one for
the signals encoding bit 1, respectively. If both detectors
have the same efficiency η, then the loss in the detec-
tion rate can be treated as a part of transmission loss
followed by ideal detectors with perfect efficiency. How-
ever, in practice, it is hard to build two detectors with
exactly the same efficiencies. So, the problem of detector-
efficiency mismatch arises. In this case we cannot treat
the detection loss as a part of the transmission loss any-
more since the detection loss is different for different de-
tectors. Also, in general, usual proofs of security of QKD
[4–7] are not applicable to this case.
For example, if detection-efficiency mismatch takes
place, then the frequency of, for example, zeros is greater
then the frequency of ones in the raw key. This increases
Eve’s a priori information on the raw key and, hence, re-
quire larger key contraction on the privacy amplification
step.
The situation becomes even more complicated if Eve
has ability to control the efficiencies in some way (for
example, by manipulation with spatial modes) [8]. Such
attacks are described and employed experimentally [9,
10]. Under some conditions, Eve can completely control
Bob’s measurements and obtain full information on the
secret key.
The security of the BB84 protocol with detection-
efficiency mismatch is proved in Ref. [8], but the proof
is restricted to the case when exactly one photon may
arrive at Bob’s side. Here we improve the bounds and
give tight bounds for the secret key rate with a constant
detection-efficiency mismatch provided that Eve cannot
send more than one photon to Bob. Here we do not ad-
dress the case when Eve can control the efficiencies of
the detectors and consider only the case of a constant
detection-efficiency mismatch.
We adopt the approach introduced in Refs. [11, 12]
based on the minimization of the relative entropy of co-
herence for the purpose of numerical determination of
the secret key rate. We show that the analytical (rather
than numerical) minimization of the relative entropy of
coherence also can be used as a method of solving QKD
problems.
The text is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we formu-
late a prepare-and-measure version of the BB84 proto-
col and specify Bob’s positive operator-valued measure
(POVM) for the case of detection-efficiency mismatch.
In Sec. III, we give an equivalent entanglement-based for-
mulation of the protocol. In Sec. IV, we review the ap-
2proach of Refs. [11, 12], which reduces the calculation of
the secret key rate to a convex optimization problem, and
state a theorem with the analytic formula for the secret
key rate, Eq. (28). A slight modification of this formula
(34), which outperforms (28) if the detection-efficiency
mismatch or quantum bit error rate (QBER) is large, is
given after the theorem. The proof of the theorem is
given in Appendix A, and the leakage of information in
the error correction procedure for the case of detection-
efficiency mismatch is analyzed in Appendix B. Finally,
in Sec. V, we propose an adaptation of the decoy state
method to prove the security of the BB84 protocol with
detection-efficiency mismatch in the case of weak coher-
ent pulses on the source side.
II. PREPARE-AND-MEASURE FORMULATION
OF THE BB84 PROTOCOL WITH
DETECTION-EFFICIENCY MISMATCH
We start with the description of a mathematical model
of the BB84 protocol with detection-efficiency mismatch.
Most practical implementations of the BB84 protocol are
prepare-and-measure based, in which Alice sends quan-
tum states to Bob. We assume that Alice sends true
qubits to Bob, i.e., single-photon pulses with information
encoded in some two-dimensional variable. Hence, Alice’s
Hilbert space is HA = C2. We will use two bases of C2:
the standard one (z basis) {|0〉 , |1〉} and the Hadamard
one (x basis) {|+〉 , |−〉}, |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. In each
basis, the first element encodes the bit 0, and the second
element encodes the bit 1.
Remark 1. In most implementations, Alice sends not
true single-photon states but weak coherent pulses, which
make QKD vulnerable to the photon number splitting at-
tack [13, 14]. However, this problem can be fixed by the
decoy-state method, which effectively allows us to bound
the number of multiphoton pulses from above [15–19].
These pulses are treated as insecure, i.e., the informa-
tion encoded in such pulses is assumed to be known to
Eve. After the estimation of the number of multiphoton
pulses, it suffices to bound Eve’s information on the key
bits originated from the single-photon pulses.
The decoy state method for the detector-efficiency
mismatch case is considered in Ref. [20] with an addi-
tional symmetry assumption that the so-called yields of
i-photon states (i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) do not depend on the
measurement basis. This is true for the case of identical
detectors, but generally not true in the case of detection-
efficiency mismatch. We propose a realization of the de-
coy state method for the case of detection-efficiency mis-
match without such assumption later in Sec. V. As we
will see, we need more detailed data than in the case of
identical detectors. In this and in the next two sections
we assume that Alice sends true single-photon pulses.
Bob measures the signals in an infinite-dimensional
mode space with no limit on the number of photons.
Eve can use this fact for her advantage: She can send
to Bob as many photons as she wishes. The issues with
the number of photons can be avoided in QKD with per-
fect detectors due to the squashing model method [22].
However, there is no squashing model for the detection-
efficiency mismatch case, hence, zero-photon and multi-
photon cases should be analyzed explicitly. As in Ref. [8],
our security proof is based on the additional assumption
that Eve sends no more than one photon to Bob. Note
that a possible way to assure that Eve does not send more
than one photon to Bob is the use of the detector-decoy
idea [21]. Another approach to bound the multiphoton
pulses is proposed in Ref. [23].
Thus, the Bob’s Hilbert space is HB = C3 and is
spanned by three vectors: |0〉 , |1〉, and |vac〉 (a vacuum
vector).
Let us describe the Bob’s POVM. Bob chooses the z
measurement basis with the probability pz and the x ba-
sis with the probability px = 1 − pz. We consider the
BB84 protocol with single-photon detectors and the ac-
tive basis choice. In this case, Bob uses two single-photon
detectors: One for the signals encoding bit 0 and one for
the signals encoding bit 1.
Let the efficiencies of the Bob’s detectors be η0 and
η1 6= η0, respectively. Let, for definiteness, 1 ≥ η0 >
η1 > 0. Then the efficiencies of the detectors can be
renormalized as η′0 = 1 and η
′
1 = η = η1/η0, and the
common loss η0 in both detectors can be treated as addi-
tional transmission loss [23]. The mismatch parameter η
is assumed to be constant and known to both legitimate
parties and the eavesdropper.
As shown in Ref. [22], without loss of generality, we
can think that the actual measurement is preceded by
a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement of the
number of photons (POVM {|vac〉 〈vac| , I2}, where I2 is
a identity operator in the two-dimensional single-photon
subspace, which is spanned by |0〉 and |1〉). Then, the
Bob’s POVM is as follows:
PBz,0 = pz |0〉 〈0| , PBz,1 = pzη |1〉 〈1| , (1a)
PBx,0 = px |+〉 〈+| , PBx,1 = pxη |−〉 〈−| , (1b)
PB
∅
= I3 − PBz,0 − PBz,1−PBx,0 − PBx,1, (1c)
where I3 is the identity operator in the three-dimensional
Bob’s space and ∅ corresponds to the outcome“no click.”
It happens whenever either the outcome of the QND is
vac or a photon hits the detector 1, but the no-click event
is activated with the probability 1− η.
Now we describe the protocol.
1. Alice randomly, with the probabilities (1/2, 1/2),
chooses a bit value a ∈ {0, 1};
2. Alice randomly, with the probabilities (pz, px = 1−
pz), chooses a basis: either the z basis or x basis. It
is assumed that pz ≈ 1. Only the z basis is used for
the key generation, while the x basis is used only
for the detection of eavesdropping (see below).
3. Bob also chooses a measurement basis: either the z
basis or x basis, also with the probabilities (pz, px).
34. Alice generates a photon in the state depending on
the basis and the bit value and send it to Bob. For
example, if Alice has chosen the bit value 0 and the
x basis, she sends a photon in the state |+〉. Bob
measures this photon according to POVM (1) and,
if at least one detector clicks, obtain the bit value
b.
5. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1–3 a large number
of times, n. As a result, they have their own bit
strings a and b, which are referred to as the raw
keys.
6. Announcements: Bob announces the numbers of
positions where he has obtained a click over a pub-
lic authentic classical channel. Alice and Bob an-
nounce the bases they used and the bit values for
positions where both used the x basis.
7. Sifting: Alice and Bob keep the states where they
both chose the z basis and Bob obtained a click.
The other positions are dropped from the raw keys.
The resulting keys are referred to as the sifted keys.
8. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob analyze the
announced data and estimate the amount of infor-
mation on the Alice’s sifted key that can be known
to Eve. If this amount is not too large, they con-
tinue. Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
9. Error correction: The mismatches between the bit
values of Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys are treated
as the errors in the Bob’s key. Alice sends to Bob
a syndrome of her sifted key over the classical au-
thentic channel. Using the syndrome, Bob corrects
the errors in his key. Now the Bob’s corrected key
coincides with the Alice’s sifted key.
10. Privacy amplification: Alice sends to Bob a hash
function, and both apply this function to their
(identical) keys. The hash function maps the key
to a shorter key about which Eve has only negligi-
ble amount of information. This is the final key, or
secret key.
Remark 2. In this paper we consider only asymptotic
case n → ∞ and do not address the finite-key effects
[5, 6]. For this reason, we also do not address some
practical peculiarities like the verification after the error-
correction step [24, 25] or the use of both bases for the
key generation since they do not matter in the asymptotic
case.
III. ENTANGLEMENT-BASED FORMULATION
OF THE PROTOCOL
We have described the prepare-and-measure imple-
mentation of the BB84 protocol, which is the most
common in practice. However, a common mathemati-
cal trick is to reformulate the protocol in an equivalent
entanglement-based version. In the entanglement-based
version of the protocol, an entangled state ρAB is dis-
tributed among the legitimate parties. Alice’s measure-
ment result encodes the information about which state
she prepared. Let us describe the entanglement-based
version of the BB84 protocol.
The steps 1, 2, and 4 of the protocol given above are
replaced by the following:
1. A source of entangled states generates a two-qubit
entangled state
ρAB = |Φ〉AB 〈Φ| , (2)
where
|Φ〉AB =
1√
2
(|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B + |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B), (3)
and sends the first qubit to Alice and the second
qubit to Bob.
2. Alice perform a measurement of her part according
to the POVM
PAz,0 = pz |0〉 〈0| , PAz,1 = pz |1〉 〈1| ,
PAx,0 = px |+〉 〈+| , PAx,1 = px |−〉 〈−| .
(4)
The probabilities of obtaining these results pro-
vided that the state is ρA = TrB ρAB = I2/2 are:
pz/2, pz/2, px/2, and px/2, respectively. If Alice obtains
the result, say (x, 1), then the state is changed to
ρAB → |−〉A 〈−| ⊗ |−〉B 〈−| , (5)
i.e., is equivalent to sending the state |−〉 to Bob. In this
sense, the entanglement-based formulation is mathemat-
ically equivalent to the prepare-and-measure one. Note
that since Alice’s measurement is virtual, it corresponds
to detectors with perfect efficiency.
In the prepare-and-measure formulation of the proto-
col, Eve controls the transmission channel between Alice
and Bob. In the equivalent entanglement-based formu-
lation this is modeled by the Eve’s ability to replace (2)
by her own density operator ρAB acting on the space
HA ⊗ HB = C2 ⊗ C3 under the restriction of the fixed
ρA = TrB ρAB. This means that the subsystem A is in-
accessible for Eve. One may think about the source of
entangled states placed inside the Alice’s laboratory, so,
Eve has access only to the subsystem B transmitting over
the channel. In our case (2) we have ρA = I2/2.
IV. SECRET KEY RATE
We define the secret key rate as the ratio of the length
of the final key to the number of channel uses n. To derive
the formula for it, we need to formalize the steps of the
QKD protocol given above. We adopt the mathematical
model developed in Refs. [11, 12].
4Alice’s and Bob’s measurements with the announce-
ments are described by the following quantum channel:
ρAB 7→
∑
a∈{z,x}
∑
b∈{z,x}
KAa ⊗KBb ρAB(KAa ⊗KBb )†
+
∑
a∈{z,x}
KAa ⊗KB∅ρAB(KAa ⊗KB∅ )†
=M(ρAB) = ρ(2)AA˜ABB˜B,
(6)
where
KAa =
∑
α∈{0,1}
√
PAa,α ⊗ |a〉A˜ ⊗ |α〉A , (7a)
KBb =
∑
β∈{0,1}
√
PBb,β ⊗ |b〉B˜ ⊗ |β〉B , (7b)
KB
∅
=
√
PB
∅
|∅〉B˜ |0〉B . (7c)
Here the registers A˜ (two-dimensional) and B˜ (three-
dimensional) store the information that is announced in
the public channel: bases choices and the result ∅ for
Bob. The two-dimensional registers A and B store the
key bit, which is not announced.
The sifting step is described by the projector
Π = |z〉A˜ 〈z| ⊗ |z〉B˜ 〈z| , (8)
ρ
(2)
AA˜ABB˜B
7→ 1
ppass
Πρ
(2)
AA˜ABB˜B
Π = ρ
(3)
AA˜ABB˜B
, (9)
where ppass = TrΠρ
(2)
AA˜ABB˜B
is the probability of passing
the sifting stage.
In the general scheme given in Ref. [11], an additional
key map g(a, b, α) is used to form Alice’s key bit in an
additional register. In this particular protocol, we do not
need this since Alice’s and Bob’s key bits are already
given in the registers A and B. Let us also define a
pinching (partially dephasing) quantum channel
Z(σ) =
∑
α∈{0,1}
(|α〉A 〈α| ⊗ I)σ (|α〉A 〈α| ⊗ I), (10)
where I is the identity operator acting on all remaining
spaces except A, and
Z(ρ(3)
AA˜ABB˜B
) = ρ
(4)
AA˜ABB˜B
. (11)
As we said in the end of Sec. III, Eve can choose the
state ρAB under the restriction ρA = TrB ρAB = I2/2.
Also, according to the purification theorem, ρAB can be
expressed as ρAB = TrE ρABE , where ρABE is a pure
state in a larger Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE , and all
such representations are unitary equivalent [29]. Eve is
assumed to own the additional register E (the purifica-
tion of ρAB).
In this paper we restrict our analysis to the case when
Eve performs a collective attack: She prepares n equal
copies of ρABE and then perform a collective measure-
ment on her parts E in all copies. According to Devetak
and Winter theorem [30], the asymptotic (n→∞) secret
key rate is given by
K = ppass
[
H(A|EA˜B˜)ρ(4) −H(A|BA˜B˜)ρ(4)
]
, (12)
where H is the conditional von Neumann entropy. Here
the first and the second terms in the brackets charac-
terize Eve’s and Bob’s ignorances about Alice’s key bit,
respectively. Here we assume that the length of the error-
correcting syndrome is given by the Shannon theoretical
limit. Otherwise, a factor f > 1 should be added to the
second term. The present-day error-correcting codes al-
low for f = 1.22. A method of using of the low-density
parity-check codes in QKD, which allows us to decrease
the factor f , is given in Refs. [26, 27]. A syndrome-based
QBER estimation algorithm, which also can decrease f ,
is proposed in Ref. [28].
The second term in the right-hand side of Eq. (12)
is bounded from above by h(Q), where h is the binary
entropy and Q is the QBER in the z basis. Note that,
due to detection-efficiency mismatch, the channel from
A to B is not a binary symmetric channel. However, in
our case the second term can be taken to be equal to
h(Q); see Appendix B for details. The QBER is a value
observed by Alice and Bob.
Eve’s ignorance should be estimated from below. By
Theorem 1 from Ref. [31],
H(A|EA˜B˜)ρ(4) = D(ρ(3)AA˜ABB˜B‖ρ
(4)
AA˜ABB˜B
)
= p−1passD
(G(ρAB)‖Z(G(ρAB))), (13)
where
G(ρAB) = ΠM(ρAB)Π (14)
and D(σ‖τ) = Trσ log σ − Tr σ log τ is the quantum rel-
ative entropy. The advantage of formula (13) is that the
right-hand side does not involve the additional register
E.
Note that, since Z is a partially dephasing channel,
Eq. (13) is a generalization of a coherence measure pro-
posed in Ref. [32] called the relative entropy of coher-
ence. Its operational meaning in QKD is investigated in
Ref. [33]. It is the distance between the quantum state
G(ρAB), emerging as a result of a QKD protocol, and
its partially dephased (“partially classical”) counterpart.
Thus, the eavesdropper’s ignorance in quantum key dis-
tribution is equal to a measure of quantumness of the
distributed bipartite state.
The state ρAB is chosen by Eve and, hence, is unknown
to Alice and Bob. So, to make a reliable estimate of the
secret key rate, they should minimize quantity (13) over
all possible quantum states on HA ⊗HB satisfying a set
5of restrictions. We arrive at the optimization problem:
K = min
ρAB∈S
D
(G(ρAB)‖Z(G(ρAB)))− ppassh(Qz), (15a)
S = {ρ ≥ 0 on HA ⊗HB ‖TrΓiρ = γi, ∀i}. (15b)
Here the operators Γi specify the restrictions:
(1) Weighted mean detection rate in the z basis:
Γ1 = I2 ⊗ (ηPBz,0 + PBz,1) = pzηI2 ⊗ I2; (16)
(2) Weighted mean error detection rate in the x basis:
Γ2 =
1
p2x
(PAx,0 ⊗ PBx,1 + ηPAx,1 ⊗ PBx,0)
= η(|+〉 〈+| ⊗ |−〉 〈−|+ |−〉 〈−| ⊗ |+〉 〈+|); (17)
(3) Fixation of ppass, or, in other words, the sifted key
rate:
Γ3 = I2 ⊗ (PBz,0 + PBz,1). (18)
We have ppass = pz TrΓ3ρAB. Recall that we con-
sider the asymptotic case of infinitely many pulses sent
by Alice, n → ∞. In this case, px can be made arbi-
trarily small. The x basis does not participate in the
secret key generation; it is used only to estimate γ2. In
the limit of infinitely many pulses, an arbitrarily small
fraction of them is sufficient to collect a reliable statis-
tics. So, in the following, we put pz = 1 and px = 0 in
Eq. (15a), but still use the x basis statistics in Eq. (17).
Then ppass = TrΓ3ρAB
Let us discuss the first restriction Γ1. Denote t =
Tr ρAB(I2 ⊗ I2) ≤ 1. In the no-eavesdropping case this
corresponds to the transparency of the transmission line
(so that 1 − t is the trace of the vacuum component of
the Bob’s space). Then Tr Γ1ρAB = tη. So, Γ1 fixes the
transparency for a constant known η.
Together with the restriction Γ3, the restriction Γ1 ad-
ditionally fixes the ratio of zeros and ones in the Bob’s
sifted key. If the probability of error in the channel in the
no-eavesdropping case does not depend on the bit value,
then the ratio of the number of ones to the number of
zeros is η. The restrictions Γ1 and Γ3 prevent Eve from
changing this ratio. As can be seen from Appendix A
[see Eqs. (A8) and (A9)], the restriction Γ1 can be equiv-
alently replaced by the detection rate of either only zeros
or only ones: Γ′1 = I2⊗PBz,β, where either β = 0 or β = 1.
Finally, let us denote Qx = TrΓ2ρAB/(tη). In the case
of no detection-efficiency mismatch η = 1, this is the
QBER in the x basis. Thus,
Tr Γ1ρAB = tη, (19a)
Tr Γ2ρAB = tηQx, (19b)
Tr Γ3ρAB = ppass, (19c)
where t and ppass are in the range (0, 1] and Qx is in the
range [0, 1].
Note also that the error rate in the z basis Qz in
Eq. (15a) is formally given by Qz = TrΓ4ρAB/(tη),
where Γ4 = P
A
z,0⊗PBz,1+ ηPAz,1⊗PBz,0. But we do not use
this restriction in the optimization problem (15): Only
the first term in the right-hand side of Eq. (15a) is a sub-
ject for optimization and we use only restrictions (16)–
(18) for it.
Remark 3. The “maximal” set of restrictions is {Γjk =
PAj ⊗PBk } added by the unit trace condition and the fix-
ation of ρA = TrB ρAB by means of the Pauli matrices
[11]. Do some restrictions in addition to (16)–(18) al-
low to obtain tighter bounds on the Eve’s ignorance and,
hence, to provide higher secret key rates? The answer
depends on the type of the noise in the channel. The
natural noise in the transmission line is often described
by the depolarizing channel acting in the qubit space:
EQ(ρ2) = (1− 2Q)ρ2 + 2QI2/2, (20)
where Q is a QBER in both bases. So, the entan-
gled stated distributed to Alice and Bob in the no-
eavesdropping case is:
ρ0AB = (IdA ⊗ EQ)(|Φ〉AB 〈Φ|)⊕ 0
+ (1− t)(I2/2)⊗ |vac〉 〈vac| , (21)
where IdA is the identity channel in the Alice’s space, EQ
acts in the single-photon subspace of the Bob’s space, and
⊕0 denotes the embedding of the four-dimensional space
into the six-dimensional one (with the vacuum compo-
nent of the Bob’s space). Then one can take
γi = Tr ρ
0
ABΓi (22)
for all i, i.e., γ1 = tη, γ2 = tηQ, and γ3 = t(1 + η)/2.
In this case, additional restrictions in comparison to
Eqs. (16)–(18) does not alter the solution of the opti-
mization problem (15) and, hence, do not increase the
secret key rate; see Remark 6 in the end of Appendix A
after the proof of the main theorem.
Thus, the bounds for the secret key rate given below
are tight whenever the natural noise in the channel is
described by the depolarizing channel (20) and (21). In
some other cases, additional restrictions may increase the
secret key rate [12, 33, 34].
One may also ask what intuition stands behind a par-
ticular choice of the operators Γ1, Γ2, and Γ3. We also
postpone the answer to this question until the end of
Appendix A. Here we can say that the matrices of these
operators have simple forms; see Eq. (A8). Namely, one
can see that, up to a constant factor, the matrix of Γ2
coincides with the matrix of the standard (for the case
of no detection-efficiency mismatch) phase error rate op-
erator. The value of either ppass or t = Tr ρAB(I2 ⊗ I2)
is also obviously required to estimate the secret key rate
in the case of no efficiency mismatch η = 1. In this case,
ppass = t. In the case of detection-efficiency mismatch,
these are different operators and we need both.
Now we are ready to formulate the main theorem.
6Theorem 1. Optimization problem (15)–(19) has feasi-
ble solutions if and only if
2Qx ≥ 1−
√
1− δ2, (23)
where
δ =
2ppass − t(1 + η)
t(1− η) . (24)
In this case, the optimal value of the objective function is
given by
K(Qz, Qx, η, t, ppass)
= ppass
[
h
(
1 + δ
2ppass
)
− h(λ(Qx, η, t, ppass))− h(Qz)
]
,
(25)
where
λ(Q, η, t, ppass)
=
1
2
− t
4ppass
√
[1− η + δ(1 + η)]2 + 4η(1− 2Q)2.
(26)
The proof is provided in Appendix A. Now we consider
an important particular case.
Corollary 1. If
ppass = t(1 + η)/2, (27)
then the optimal value of the objective function in opti-
mization problem (15)–(19) is given by
K(Qz, Qx, η)
= ppass
[
h
(
1
1 + η
)
− h(λ(Qx, η))− h(Qz)
]
, (28)
where
λ(Q, η) =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 16ηQ(1−Q)
(1 + η)2
. (29)
Formulas (25) and (28) are the desired formulas for the
secret key rate. They are tight for the proposed protocol
since the optimization problem is solved exactly.
Condition (23) means that there is no positive semi-
definite operator ρAB satisfying Eq. (19) if inequality (23)
is not satisfied. Hence, the values of t, Qx, and ppass not
satisfying inequality (23) cannot be obtained.
Let us discuss the difference between formulas (25) and
(28). Suppose that the transmission loss and the prob-
ability of error in the channel in the no-eavesdropping
case are independent on the bit value (i.e., are the same
for the states |0〉 and |1〉). In particular, the depolarizing
channel in (20) and (21) satisfies this condition. Then,
in the no-eavesdropping case, Eq. (27) is satisfied: ppass
equals the average between the efficiencies of the detec-
tors multiplied by the transparency t. In the asymptotic
case n → ∞, Eve cannot violate equality (27) because,
otherwise, Alice and Bob will detect the eavesdropping
precisely by observing the violation of Eq. (27). Hence,
Eve is restricted to attacks that do not violate Eq. (27),
and the secret key rate is given by Eq. (28).
However, formula (28) itself cannot be used in prac-
tice because in the finite-key scenario, even in the no-
eavesdropping case, the statistical fluctuations lead to
deviations of ppass from its mean value t(1 + η)/2. Since
we cannot distinguish the statistical deviations from a
small δ introduced by Eve, we must be able to bound
the Eve’s knowledge on the sifted key for an arbitrary δ
in some neighborhood of zero. Formula (25) do this and
can be used as a starting point in the finite-key analysis.
But in the rest of the paper we will be interested in the
actual secret key rate in the asymptotic case and, so, will
consider only formula (28).
For perfect detection η = 1, formula (28) gives the
well-known result [4]:
K = t[1− h(Qx)− h(Qz)] (30)
In another particular case of Qx = Qz = 0 (noiseless
case), formula (28) gives another known result, which
was obtained in Ref. [8]:
K = ppassh
(
1
1 + η
)
. (31)
Let us compare formula (28) to the two formulas ob-
tained in Ref. [8]:
K1 = ppass
{
2η
1 + η
[1− h(Qx)]− h(Qz)
}
, (32)
K2 = ppass
2η
1 + η
[1− h(Qz)− h(Qx)]. (33)
The first formula is obtained as a result of a more gen-
eral analysis, which includes the cases when η is under
Eve’s control, applied to the particular case of a con-
stant η. The second formula is obtained by the simple
discarding argument. Of course, the simplest solution to
the detection-efficiency mismatch problem is to discard
every zero from the Bob’s raw key (to turn it into the
no-click event) with the probability 1− η. This allows us
to artificially adjust the efficiencies of the two detectors
so that both cases of 0 and 1 bit values are “detected”
with the probability η. Thus, the secret key rate is equal
to the right-hand side of Eq. (30) multiplied by η, which
gives exactly Eq. (33).
The comparison of these formulas are given in Fig. 1.
We see that formula (28) gives definitely higher secret
key rates than Eq. (32). Also it gives higher secret key
rates than Eq. (33) for the most of range of η. Only in
the case of small η, which corresponds to a large efficiency
mismatch, does the discarding provide higher rates. This
does not contradict the tightness of bound (28) since the
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Figure 1. Secret key rate K(Q,Q, η) of the BB84 protocol vs
the efficiency of one of the detectors η. Another detector and
the transmission line are assumed to be perfect; otherwise,
the secret key rate is reduced by a constant factor. Red: the
noiseless case Q = 0. Blue: the case Q = 0.05. Solid line:
formula (28) (deviates from the previous one only for the noisy
case and small η). Dashed line: formula (32). Dotted line:
formula (33) [coincides with Eq. (32) for the noiseless case].
possibility of discarding (a kind of preprocessing of the
observation data) immediately after the transmission of
quantum states is not provided in our description of the
protocol. Also the calculations according to formula (28)
coincide with the numerical results of Ref. [11].
We can modify our protocol to overcome this limitation
of formula (28). Namely, we can combine the discard-
ing of some zeros (to improve the statistical properties
of the Bob’s raw key) and calculations according to for-
mula (28). Let Bob discards every zero outcome with a
probability 1 − η1 ≤ 1 − η. After that, the “remaining”
detection-efficiency mismatch corresponds to the detec-
tor efficiency η2 = η/η1 ≥ η and we can use formula (28)
with η substituted by η2. So, we arrive at the formula
[for simplicity, let Eq. (27) be satisfied]
K(Qz, Qx, η) = maxη1η2=η,
η1≥η.
tη1(1 + η2)
2
×
[
h
(
1
1 + η2
)
− h(λ(Qx, η2))− h(Qz)
]
, (34)
where t and Qx are related to the observed values of Γ1
and Γ2 in Eqs. (16) and (17) with η replaced by η2. In the
limiting cases (η1 = 1, η2 = η) and (η1 = η, η2 = 1), we
obtain formulas (28) and (33), respectively. The results
of calculations according to formula (34) are shown in
Figs. 2 and 3. We see that Eq. (34) outperforms Eqs. (32)
and (33) and also outperforms Eq. (28) if the detection-
efficiency mismatch or QBER is large.
The decrease of secret key rate with the decrease of η
shown on Figs. 1–3 is caused by two effects: the decrease
of the average detector efficiency (1+η)/2 and detection-
efficiency mismatch as such. To distinguish the influence
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Figure 2. Secret key rate K(Q,Q, η) of the BB84 protocol vs
the efficiency of one of the detectors η. The lines are the same
as in Fig. 1, except that the thick solid line has been added.
It corresponds to formula (34) and outperforms Eq. (28) (thin
solid line) one only for the noisy case and small η.
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Figure 3. Secret key rate K(Q,Q, η) of the BB84 protocol
vs the efficiency of one of the detectors η, for Q = 0.10. The
lines are the same as on Fig. 2. Formula (34) outperforms
Eq. (28) for the most range of η.
of the mismatch as such, we compare the secret key rates
for the mismatch case with the detector efficiencies 1 and
η and the no-mismatch case with both efficiencies equal
to (1 + η)/2. The secret key rate for the latter case is
given by Eq. (30) with the right-hand side multiplied by
(1 + η)/2. The ratio of the secret key rate in the mis-
match case to that in the no-mismatch case for various
QBERs is shown on Fig. 4. We see that first the secret
key rate is larger influenced by mismatch for high QBERs
and second, if the mismatch is not very large, then the
decrease of secret key rate is also relatively small even
for high QBERs. For example, the secret key rate for
η = 0.7 and Q = 0.09 is above 90% of the secret key rate
for the no-mismatch case with the same Q and average
efficiency.
Finally, let us recall, that, if both detectors are
not perfect and have efficiencies η0 and η1, then η =
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Figure 4. Decrease of secret key rate in the detection
efficiency-mismatch case with respect to the no-mismatch
case: the ratio of the secret key rate in the mismatch case
with the detector efficiencies 1 and η to the secret key rate in
the no-mismatch case with both efficiencies equal to (1+η)/2,
for various QBERs (Qz = Qx = Q). If the mismatch is not
very large, then the decrease of secret key rate is relatively
small even for high QBERs.
min(η0, η1)/max(η0, η1), and the secret key rate is
K(Qz, Qx, η0, η1) = max(η0, η1)K(Qz, Qx, η) (35)
withK(Qz, Qx, η) given by either Eqs. (25), (28), or (34).
V. DECOY STATE METHOD IN THE CASE OF
DETECTION-EFFICIENCY MISMATCH
In this section we adapt the decoy state method to the
case of detection-efficiency mismatch. Now we take into
account that Alice sends not true single-photon pulses,
but weak coherent pulses. We consider the scheme of one
signal state and two weak decoy states. This means that
each Alice’s pulse can be either a signal pulse with the
intensity µs = µ (used for key generation) or one of two
decoy pulses with the intensities µd1 = ν1 and µd2 = ν2,
with the conditions 0 ≤ ν2 < ν1 and ν1 + ν2 < µ.
We follow the method of Ref. [17], where a lower bound
for the number of detections originated from the single-
photon pulses and an upper bound for the error rate for
the single-photon pulses were derived. A difference with
the case of no efficiency mismatch is that we need sep-
arate detection data for each basis and each of Bob’s
measurement outcome.
At first, let us discuss the scenario and processing of
double clicks. We assume that Alice emits a mixture of i-
photon states, i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., with the probabilities given
by the Poisson distribution with the parameter (the aver-
age number of photons) µv, v ∈ {s, d1, d2}. Since the out-
going quantum state should be a mixture of Fock states,
a passive or active phase randomization on the Alice’s
side is required. Eve performs a nondemolition measure-
ment of the number of photons in the pulse, which does
not change the state. In the previous sections, Eve was
not allowed to send more than one photon to Bob, but
now there are multiphoton pulses from the Alice’s source.
So, we can impose the following restriction instead: Eve
is not allowed to add more photons to a pulse. Alter-
natively, we can impose a weaker restriction: since the
multiphoton states are treated as insecure anyway, Eve
is free to do anything with these states (for example, to
add more photons), but she is not allowed to add more
photons to the single-photon states. We analyze these
assumptions in Remark 4 below.
In this scenario, the double clicks may originate either
from the Alice’s multiphoton states or from her single-
photon or vacuum states accompanied by dark counts on
the Bob’s side. Bob may perform a random equiprobable
assignment of the double clicks to one of the outcomes
[22]. This does not affect the security because the Alice’s
multiphoton states are anyway treated as insecure and
dark counts are not under Eve’s control and do not in-
crease her information on the Alice’s bit conditioned on
the click event.
Denote by N sb the number of positions where both
Alice and Bob have chosen the basis b ∈ {z, x} and Alice
has sent a signal pulse. Denote by M sbβ the number of
positions where both Alice and Bob have chosen the basis
b, Alice has sent a signal pulse, and Bob has obtained the
result β ∈ {0, 1}. Denote by Qsbβ = M sbβ/N sb the gain
for the signal states, the basis b, and the outcome β.
Correspondingly, denote by Qd1bβ and Qd2bβ the gains
for the two types of decoy states, the basis b, and the
outcome β. These gains should not be confused with the
QBERs Qx and Qz from the previous sections: In this
section, we use the notations that are common for the
literature on the decoy state method. For QBERs, we
will use other notations instead, see below.
Denote also by Y bβi the yield of an i-photon state, the
basis b, and the Bob’s outcome β, i.e., the conditional
probability of a detection event with the outcome β given
that Alice sends out an i-photon state and both Alice and
Bob choose the basis b. The yields Y bβi for all i are as-
sumed to be under Eve’s control. More precisely, in the
finite-key analysis, Y bβi is defined a posteriori [18]: as a
ratio of the number of i-photon states (with the specified
b and β) received by Bob to the number of such states
sent by Alice. But the numerator in this fraction is under
Eve’s control. However, a crucial trick lying in the heart
of the decoy state method is that Eve observes the num-
ber of photons in a pulse but cannot obtain knowledge on
the intensity (the parameter of the Poisson distribution)
of the pulse. Alice announces the intensity of each pulse
(µ, ν1, or ν2) on the post-processing stage. Processing
of the detection data separately for each type of pulses
leads to detection of the PNS attack and, more generally,
allows us to estimate the number of single-photon (i.e.,
secure) states received by Bob.
Note that the yield of an i-photon state depends on
the basis in the case of efficiency mismatch. For exam-
ple, the incoming Bob’s single-photon state |0〉 will be
9definitely detected if it is measured in the z basis, but
it will be detected with the probability (1 + η)/2 if it is
measured in the x basis. In Ref. [20], an additional im-
plicit assumption is imposed that Yi does not depend on
the basis. This is a restriction on the class of possible
Bob’s incoming states and, hence, on the class of manip-
ulations available for Eve. Our analysis does not require
such a restriction.
We have
Qvbβ =
∞∑
i=0
Y bβi
µiv
i!
e−µv =
∞∑
i=0
Qvbβi , (36)
v ∈ {s, d1, d2}, where
Qvbβi = Y
bβ
i
µiv
i!
e−µv (37)
is the gain for i-photon states of the type v ∈ {s, d1, d2},
the basis b, and the outcome β. Using formula (36), we
can repeat the derivation in Ref. [17] to obtain a lower
bound for the number of detections with the outcome β
in the z basis originated from the single-photon signal
pulses:
Qszβ1 ≥ QLszβ1 =
µ2e−µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
× [Qd1zβeν1 −Qd2zβeν2 − ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qszβeµ − Y Lzβ0 )],
(38)
where
Y Lzβ0 = max{
ν1Q
d2zβeν2 − ν2Qd1zβeν1
ν1 − ν2 , 0}. (39)
The upper bound is trivial: Qszβ1 ≤ Qszβ . Note that the
conditions ν2 < ν1 and ν1 + ν2 < µ (see the beginning of
this section) are used in the derivation of estimate (39).
Denote by Mvbβerr the number of positions where both
Alice and Bob have chosen the basis b, Alice has sent a
pulse of the type v encoding the bit value 1−β, and Bob
has obtained the result β. Denote by Evbβ = Mvbβerr /M
vbβ
the QBER for the pulses of the type v, the basis b ∈
{x, z}, and the Bob’s outcome β. If we denote
Qvb = Qvb0 +Qvb1 (40)
as the total gain for the v-pulses and the b basis, and
Evb =
Mvb0err +M
vb1
err
Mvb0 +Mvb1
(41)
as the usual QBER in the b basis, then
EvbQvb = Evb0Qvb0 + Evb1Qvb1. (42)
Analogously, denote by ebβi the the QBER for the i-
photon states, the basis b, and the outcome β. Like Y bβi ,
ebβi is also assumed to be under the Eve’s control. We
have
EvbβQvbβ =
∞∑
i=0
ebβi Q
vbβ
i , (43)
Ed1xβQd1xβeν1 − Ed2xβQd2xβeν2 ≥ exβ1 Y xβ1 (ν1 − ν2),
(44)
exβ1 Q
sxβ
1 ≤
(
Ed1xβQd1xβeν1 − Ed2xβQd2xβeν2) µe−µ
ν1 − ν2 .
(45)
Now we apply these results to modify formula (25) for
weak coherent pulses. The last term ppassh(Qz) corre-
sponds to the error correction in all detected signal bits.
Hence, it should be rewritten as Qszh(Esz).
The first two terms in Eq. (25) correspond to the
Eve’s ignorance and, hence, should obtain only single-
photon contributions: Information encoded in multipho-
ton pulses is assumed to be completely known to Eve.
So, let ρAB be the (unnormalized) density operator con-
taining only the vacuum and single-photon parts of signal
pulses. Then, according to the previous definitions,
Tr(I2 ⊗ PBbβ)ρAB = Qsbβ1 , (46)
and hence
t = Qsz01 +Q
sz1
1 /η, ppass = Q
sz0
1 +Q
sz1
1 , (47)
and
TrΓ2ρAB ≡ γ2 = ηesx01 Qsx01 + esx11 Qsx11 . (48)
So, the first two terms in Eq. (25) should be modified to
ppass
[
h
(
1 + δ
2ppass
)
− h(λ(γ2/(tη), η, t, ppass))
]
(49)
and the secret key rate is equal to
K(Qsz01 , Q
sz1
1 , γ2)
= ppass
[
h
(
1 + δ
2ppass
)
− h(λ(γ2/(tη), η, t, ppass))
]
−Qszh(Esz), (50)
where δ is, as before, defined by Eq. (24) and t, ppass,
and γ2 are defined by Eqs. (47) and (48).
But now, in contrast to the previous sections, the quan-
tities Qsz11 , Q
sz1
1 , and γ2 are not given directly; we have
only estimates. Hence, we should consider the worst-case
scenario and take values of these parameters within the
estimated ranges that give the minimal value to function
(50).
Function (50) monotonically decreases with the in-
crease of γ2. This can be established by a mathematical
investigation of this function and also is obvious from the
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physical meaning: The secret key rate certainly decreases
with the increase of the error rate. Hence, the worst-case
scenario corresponds to the maximally possible value of
γ2. In other words, we should use an upper bound for γ2.
Using estimate (45), we obtain γ2 ≤ qη, where
q =
[ (
Ed1x0Qd1x0 + Ed1x1Qd1x1/η
)
eν1
− (Ed2x0Qd2x0 + Ed2x1Qd2x1/η) eν2] µe−µ
ν1 − ν2 . (51)
The dependence of function (50) on Qsz01 and Q
sz1
1 is,
in general, nonmonotonic, so, we should minimize over
these quantities in the range
QLszβ1 ≤ Qszβ1 ≤ Qszβ , β = 0, 1, (52)
with QLszβ1 defined in Eq. (38).
However, in the simulation on Fig. 5 below, the min-
imum is always achieved in the lower bounds: Qszβ1 =
QLszβ1 , β = 0, 1. The reason is that function (50) mono-
tonically decreases with the decrease of Qsz01 or Q
sz1
1 in
a neighborhood of a point (Q¯sz01 , Q¯
sz1
1 ) if Q¯
sz1
1 /Q¯
sz0
1 = η.
Such points correspond to the case of the depolarizing
channel (21) and equality (27). Hence, if the lower
bounds QLszβ1 are not too far from the actual values of
Qszβ1 and belong to this neighborhood, the minimum is
achieved in these lower bounds. However, for generality,
we leave the minimization operation.
Thus, the final formula for the secret key rate is
K = min
Qsz01 ,Q
sz1
1
ppass
[
h
(
1 + δ
2ppass
)
− h(λ(q/t, η, t, ppass))
]
−Qszh(Esz), (53)
where the minimization is over range (52).
Finally, let us note that if we express δ directly through
Qsz01 and Q
sz1
1 , then Eq. (53) can be rewritten in the
following way, which is, in some sense, simpler and more
intuitive:
K = min
Qsz01 ,Q
sz1
1
ppass
[
h(λ˜(t/2, Qsz01 , Q
sz1
1 , η))
−h(λ˜(q,Qsz01 , Qsz11 , η))
]
−Qszh(Esz), (54)
where
λ˜(q,Qsz01 , Q
sz1
1 , η)
=
1
2
− 1
2ppass
√
(Qsz01 −Qsz11 )2 + η(t− 2q)2. (55)
Remark 4. Now let us discuss the role of the assumption
(see the beginning of this section) that Eve is free to do
anything with multiphoton states (for example, to add
more photons), but is not allowed to add more photons
to the single-photon states. The analysis of detection
data in the decoy state BB84 protocol consists of two
parts:
(i) estimating the number of single-photon signal pulses
and QBERs for single-photon states, and
(ii) estimating the Eve’s information about the part of
the sifted key originated from single-photon states.
This part uses the results of part (i) and the results
of a security analysis for the case of a true single-
photon source.
Information encoded in multiphoton states is assumed to
be completely known to Eve.
In other words, such a scheme allows us to adapt the
results obtained for a true single-photon source to the
case of weak coherent pulses. But the assumptions made
in the analysis for weak coherent pulses must be in agree-
ment with those made in the analysis for single-photon
states.
In our analysis for single-photon states we assumed
that Eve is not allowed to add more photons to such
pulses. Hence, in order to use the results of this analysis
[namely, formula (25)] in part (ii), we should assume that
if a pulse contains only one photon, Eve cannot add more
to it.
Now let us consider part (i). A nice feature of the es-
timations of the fractions of single-photon states and the
corresponding QBERs developed in Ref. [17] is that they
actually do not impose any assumptions on the efficiency
of detectors or on particular forms of Y bβi and e
bβ
i . In-
equalities (38) and (45) are based only on non-negativity
of Y bβi and e
bβ
i . Namely, inequality (44) is a simple al-
gebraic consequence of Eqs. (43) and (37) together with
non-negativity of Y bβi and e
bβ
i . The derivation of estimate
(38) is a bit more complicated and is given in Ref. [17] but
also is purely algebraic and based solely on non-negativity
of Y bβi and e
bβ
i . This actually means that estimates (38)
and (45) are still valid even if Eve is free to set Y bβi and
ebβi for all i to arbitrary values. For example, she is free
to add more photons to i-photon states to increase Y bβi ,
etc. In principle, solely in part (i), we can even allow Eve
to have full control on the detector efficiencies.
Thus, we need not have any assumptions on the Eve’s
abilities at all for part (i), i.e., for inequalities (38) and
(45). We only need to forbid Eve to add more photons
to single-photon states in order to use the results of the
analysis for a true single-photon source in part (ii).
The separation of the detection data for each basis and
each measurement outcome is also needed for part (ii) but
not part (i). Estimation of the aggregated quantities Qs1
and e1 is also possible in part (i) because, again, no as-
sumption except non-negativity of yields and error rates
is used in the estimations in Ref. [17]. But quantities
(47) and (48), which are necessary for Eq. (25), require
separate data for each basis and each outcome (the lat-
ter is because Qsb01 and Q
sb1
1 enter these quantities with
different weights).
The results of calculations of the secret key rate for the
decoy state protocol according to formula (54) [or (53)]
is given on Fig. 5. The parameters have been chosen as
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follows: the intensity of the signal state µ = 0.5, the in-
tensities of two decoy states ν1 = 0.1 and ν2 = 0, the
fiber attenuation coefficient δ = 0.2 dB/km, additional
losses in the Bob’s optical scheme tBob = 5 dB, the op-
tical error probability (see Ref. [17]) edet = 0.01 , the
efficiencies of the detectors η0 = 0.1 and η1 = 0.07 (i.e.,
η = η1/η0 = 0.7), and the dark count probability per
pulse for each detector Y β=00 = Y
β=1
0 = 10
−6.
We compare the secret key rate according to formulas
(53) and (54) with a theoretical limit: formula (50) with
the actual values of Qsz11 , Q
sz1
1 , and γ2 = TrΓ2ρAB (given
by Eq. (48)).
For the calculation of the actual values of these quan-
tities, we employ the standard model of losses and errors
in a fiber-based QKD setup; see, e.g., Ref. [17]. The
probability that a photon emitted by Alice will reach the
Bob’s detectors is 10−(δl+δBob)/10, where l is the trans-
mission distance in kilometers. Since this probability is
rather small even for l = 0 and is very small for realis-
tic distances, the probability that Alice’s i-photon state
will reach Bob’s detectors can be approximately taken
as i10−(δl+δBob)/10. This approximation actually means
that we neglect the possibility that more than one photon
from Alice’s pulse will reach Bob’s detectors.
The optical error probability edet is the probability
that a photon that has reached Bob’s detectors will hit
the wrong detector. Then the detection in the detec-
tor β ∈ {0, 1} occurs if either Alice sends the bit β (with
the probability 1/2) and no optical error occurs (with the
probability 1−edet) or Alice sends the bit 1−β (also with
the probability 1/2) and an optical error occurs (with the
probability edet). In both cases the pulse should reach the
detectors (with the probability i10−(δl+δBob)/10) and the
detector β should register the photon (with the prob-
ability ηβ). One more possibility is the dark count of
the detector β, which occurs with the probability Y β0 .
Again, we neglect the probability of simultaneous dark
count with the detection of a photon since both proba-
bilities are small. Thus, the actual value of Y bβi is given
by
Y bβi = Y
β
0 + i10
− δl+δBob10 (1− edet) + edet
2
ηβ
= Y β0 + i10
− δl+δBob10 ηβ/2. (56)
The actual values of Qvbβ and Qvbβ1 are given then by
Eqs. (36), (37), and (56). The actual values of ebβi are
given by
ebβi =
Y β0 + i10
− δl+δBob10 edetηβ
2Y bβi
, (57)
where we have taken into account that a dark count can
be correct or erroneous with the probability 1/2. Then
the actual values of Evbβ and γ2 = TrΓ2ρAB are given
by Eqs. (43), (48), and (57). Note that both Y bβi and e
bβ
i
are basis-independent in this model.
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Figure 5. Secret key rate of the decoy state BB84 proto-
col with detection-efficiency mismatch. The parameters are
as follows: the intensity of the signal state, µ = 0.5; the in-
tensities of and two decoy states, ν1 = 0.1 and ν2 = 0; the
fiber attenuation coefficient, 0.2 dB/km; additional losses in
the Bob’s optical scheme, 5 dB; the optical error probability
edet = 0.01; the efficiencies of the detectors, η0 = 0.1 and
η1 = 0.07 (i.e., η = η1/η0 = 0.7); and the dark count proba-
bility per pulse for each detector, Y β=0
0
= Y β=1
0
= 10−6. Blue
line: performance of the protocol according to derived formula
(54) [or (53)]. Red dashed line: theoretical limit, formula (50)
with the actual values of Qsz11 , Q
sz1
1 , and γ2 = TrΓ2ρAB [given
by Eq. (48)]. Green line: theoretical limit for the case of no
efficiency mismatch but the same average detection efficiency
(η0 + η1)/2 (like on Fig. 4).
A comparison of the secret key rate with the described
theoretical limit shows the quality of estimates (38) and
(45). As we see from Fig. 5, the secret key rate is very
close to the theoretical limit. This is not surprising since,
as is shown in Ref. [17], estimates (38) and (45) are tight
in the limit ν1 → 0, ν2 = 0.
Also, we compare the secret key rate with the the-
oretical limit in the case of no efficiency-mismatch but
the same average detection efficiency (η0 + η1)/2 (like
on Fig. 4). This comparison shows how much the se-
cret key rate in the decoy state protocol is decreased by
detection-efficiency mismatch. In agreement with Fig. 4,
we see that the decrease is rather small.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have proved the security of the BB84 QKD protocol
with detection-efficiency mismatch under the assumption
that the eavesdropper sends no more than one photon to
the legitimate receiver if the legitimate resender’s pulse
is single photon. We have derived tight bounds on the
secret key rate: formulas (25), (28) and (34). We used
the approach of Refs. [11, 12] based on a reduction of the
determination of the secret key rate to a convex optimiza-
tion problem: the minimization of the relative entropy of
coherence. We have demonstrated that the analytical
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(rather than numerical) minimization of the relative en-
tropy of coherence also can be used as a method of solving
QKD problems.
Also we have proposed an adaptation of the decoy state
method to the case of efficiency mismatch and obtained
formulas (53) and (54) for the secret key rate in the case
of weak coherent pulses on Alice’s side.
The knowledge of an analytic expression for the secret
key rate has certain advantages against a numerical re-
sult: The former simplifies the calculation of the secret
key rate and the analysis of its dependence on the pa-
rameters and observations (γi). In particular, the knowl-
edge of an analytic expression allowed us to adapt the
decoy state method in a rather simple way. Also an an-
alytic derivation provides deeper understanding of the
corresponding scenario. Finally, the presented analytic
approach, in principle, can deal with multidimensional
and even infinite-dimensional systems; see below. From
the other side, in complicated scenarios, the numerical
approach allows us to obtain more tight bounds for the
secret key rate. So, numerical and analytic approaches
to the minimization of the relative entropy of coherence
complement each other.
A finite-key analysis can be developed starting from
formula (25) by the use of conservative (pessimistic) sta-
tistical estimations of parameters and the entropy accu-
mulation technique [35]. Also recall that the Devetak and
Winter formula for the secret key rate (12) is valid only
for collective Eve’s attacks. Using the entropy accumu-
lation technique, the security against the most general,
coherent attacks can be proved.
The main remaining problem is the proof of the secu-
rity of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch for the
case when Eve is allowed to send an arbitrary number of
photons to Bob. She can do this, for example, to artifi-
cially increase the efficiency of one of the detectors. Also
the analysis of the case when the efficiencies of the de-
tectors are under partial Eve’s control is important due
to experimental realizations of such attacks [9, 10].
These open problems naturally raise the question
whether the presented approach based on the analytic
minimization of the relative entropy of coherence can deal
with multidimensional or even infinite-dimensional sys-
tems. The removal of either the single-photon assump-
tion or the constant efficiency mismatch leads to the in-
crease of the dimensionality. Of course, the direct solu-
tion of eigenvalue problems, which was used in the proof
of Theorem 1, is impossible in the multidimensional case.
However, a possible way to deal with this case is the use
of some quantum channel Φ which reduces the dimension-
ality. Since the quantum relative entropy cannot increase
under the action of a quantum channel simultaneously on
both arguments, we have
D
(
Φ(G(ρAB))‖Φ(Z(G(ρAB)))
)
≤ D(G(ρAB)‖Z(G(ρAB))). (58)
Hence, the minimization of the low-dimensional left-hand
side of Eq. (58) yields the lower bound on the secret key
rate. A difficulty is that the channel Φ is applied af-
ter the post-processing, but the constraints are on ρAB.
So, the optimization problem is still applied to the high-
dimensional space. However, since Φ somehow aggre-
gates the high-dimensional data, we can hope that it
could lead to certain simplification of the problem.
Thus, to extend the results of this paper to the mul-
tiphoton case, various techniques can be used. The first
way is the use of the detector decoy method [21]. The
second way is to bound the number of the multiphoton
contributions on the Bob’s side using the techniques from
Ref. [23] based on the monitoring of the average error rate
for both bases and the average double click rate for both
bases. The third way is a reduction to a low-dimensional
case and the use of formula (58) to bound the Eve’s infor-
mation originated from the multiphoton contributions on
the Bob’s side. Since the detectors are still “binary”(click
or no click) and cannot capture the detailed structure of
multidimensional states, we can hope that an appropri-
ate reduction to a low-dimensional case might exist. A
reduction channel Φ might be in some sense similar to
quantum channels using in squashing models [22]. But
an appropriate channel Φ might exist even if a squash-
ing model does not exist because we do not require any
kind of equivalence relation between the high- and low-
dimensional systems. We only need is to find a channel
which reduces the dimensionality, but does not give too
much advantage to Eve. Also one can try to combine
the numerical minimization of the Eve’s ignorance on a
subspace corresponding to a restricted number of photons
with an analytic estimation of the Eve’s ignorance on the
complement (infinite-dimensional) subspace by means of
a reduction Φ and the minimization of the left-hand side
of Eq. (58) using the techniques proposed here.
Preliminary results of this paper (including formula
(28)) were presented at the International conference
”Quantum information, statistics, probability” with a
special session dedicated to A. S. Holevo’s 75-th birth-
day [36].
Remark 5. Very recently, during the preparation of this
paper, another paper [33] was published with the deriva-
tion of formula (28) by a similar method (also based
on the analytical minimization of the relative entropy
of coherence). The differences of our result are as fol-
lows. First, in Ref. [33], a closed analytic formula (28)
is derived under an additional assumption that Eve’s at-
tack is symmetric. In contrast, we prove the validity of
Eq. (28) for arbitrary Eve’s collective attacks, but with
a weaker assumption (27) on the transmission line in the
no-eavesdropping case. Formula (25) is valid without this
assumption and can be used as a starting point for a
finite-key analysis. Second, we additionally analyze the
case when Eve can use the vacuum component of the
Bob’s space. We prove that this does not give an advan-
tage to Eve, but, a priori, this was not obvious in the case
of detection-efficiency mismatch (see the discussion in the
beginning of Sec. II). Third, we have derived a slightly
modified formula (34), which outperforms Eq. (28) if the
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detection-efficiency mismatch or QBER is large.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Preliminaries
Define
D
(
G(ρAB)‖Z
(G(ρAB))) = f(ρAB). (A1)
Sometimes we will omit the subindexes AB of ρAB. The
gradient of this function is given by [11]
∇f(ρ) = G†
(
logG(ρ) − logZ(G(ρ)))T , (A2)
where G† is the dual quantum channel to G. Since ρ
can be specified by a finite number of real numbers, the
gradient can be understood as the usual gradient of a
function of several real variables.
If the projections of the gradient (A2) to all allowable
directions of movement away from ρ (i.e., the directions
that do not violate the positivity of ρ and all restric-
tions) are non-negative, then ρ yields a local minimum
to the objective function (A1). Because of the well-known
property of the joint convexity of the quantum relative
entropy [37] and due to the convexity of the set S in
Eq. (15), a local minimum is a global one. Hence, the
non-negativity of the projections of the gradient to all
allowable directions is a sufficient condition for the global
minimum of the secret key rate.
However, this is not a necessary condition since the
gradient (A2) may be ill defined. First, if ρ belongs to
the boundary of the set S, then the gradient is ill-defined
by definition. Second, the operator G(ρAB) is typically
degenerate. This is not a problem for the relative entropy
expression (13) due to the rule 0 log 0 = 0 and the fact
that the kernel subspace of Z(G(ρ)) is a subspace of the
kernel subspace of G(ρ). But the degeneracy may be a
problem for the gradient expression (A2) if the kernel
subspace of G(ρ) is not a subspace of the kernel subspace
of G(ρ+∆ρ) for an arbitrarily small ∆ρ. In this case, the
gradient may be infinite (since the derivative of x log x is
infinite for x = 0).
Let us consider this problem. The general form of ρAB
is
ρAB =
∑
i,k∈{0,1}
∑
j,l∈{0,1,vac}
ρij,kl |ij〉 〈kl| . (A3)
Let us show that, if the operator
ρ′AB =
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
ρij,kl |ij〉 〈kl| (A4)
is non-degenerate, then the gradient (A2) is well defined
by continuity. We have
G(ρAB)= |zz〉A˜B˜ 〈zz|
⊗
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
η(j+l)/2ρij,kl |ij〉AB 〈kl| ⊗ |ij〉AB 〈kl| .
We see that G(ρAB) is degenerate on the space
AA˜ABB˜B. Namely,
G(ρAB) |ij〉AB |i′j′〉AB |ab〉A˜B˜ = 0 (A5)
whenever i 6= i′, j 6= j′, a 6= z, or b 6= z. Denote by P0
the projector onto the kernel subspace of G(ρAB). The
dual channel G† acts on an arbitrary operator C in the
space AA˜ABB˜B as:
G†(C) =
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
η(j+l)/2cij,kl |ij〉AB 〈kl| , (A6)
where
cij,kl = AB,AB,A˜B˜ 〈ij, ij, zz|C|kl, kl, zz〉AB,AB,A˜B˜ .
(A7)
So, G†(P0) = 0 and, due to the rule 0 log 0 = 0, the
expressions G†( logG(ρ)) and G†( logZ(G(ρ))) are well-
defined.
Also, the elements ρi,vac,k,vac do not contribute either
to the objective function (A1) or to the right-hand of
Eq. (A2). Hence, even if all these elements are zero,
the gradient is still well-defined by continuity (despite
that ρ belongs to the boundary of S). Formally, one
can impose some regularization onto the channel G (see
Eqs. (12)–(15) in Ref. [11]) and then pass to the limit of
infinitesimal regularization parameter.
We see that the support of G(ρAB) is isomorphic to
C2 ⊗ C2. We can consider G(ρAB) to be defined only on
the two registers AB: the registers AB are just copies of
AB, and the registers A˜B˜ contain the fixed value z.
For simplicity and graduality, the further proof of The-
orem 1 will consist of two parts. In the first part we
restrict Bob’s Hilbert space to a single-photon subspace
spanned by the states |0〉 and |1〉. Also we put t = 1 in
this case. In the second part we will show that the use
of the vacuum component does not give an advantage to
Eve.
B. The case of two-dimensional Bob’s space
HB = C2, and t = 1. The matrices Γi are:
Γ1 = η
1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , Γ2 = η
2
 1 0 0 −10 1 −1 00 −1 1 0
−1 0 0 1
 ,
Γ3 =

1 0 0 0
0 η 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 η
 (A8)
14
(the order of rows and columns are as follows: AB =
00, 01, 10, 11). Note that
TrΓiρ =
4∑
j,k=1
Γkji ρjk =
4∑
j,k=1
(
Γjki
)∗
ρjk, (A9)
where Γjki and ρjk are the elements of the corresponding
matrices. So, each Γi fixes a weighted sum of the elements
of ρ.
Let us prove the necessity of condition (23) for the ex-
istence of feasible solutions of the optimization problem.
Positive semidefiniteness of ρ implies
|ρ00,11| ≤ √ρ00,00ρ11,11, (A10a)
|ρ01,10| ≤ √ρ01,01ρ10,10. (A10b)
Denote
ρ00,00 = (1−Qz)(1 + δ0)/2, (A11a)
ρ11,11 = (1−Qz)(1− δ0)/2, (A11b)
ρ01,01 = Qz(1 − δ1)/2, (A11c)
ρ10,10 = Qz(1 + δ1)/2. (A11d)
Then, from Eqs. (19), (A8), (A10), and (A11) (recall that
now t = 1),
2Qx = 1− 2ℜρ00,11 − 2ℜρ01,10
≥ 1− (1−Qz)
√
1− δ20 −Qz
√
1− δ21 (A12)
and
ppass =
1 + η
2
+
1− η
2
[(1−Qz)δ0 +Qzδ1]. (A13)
The right-hand side of Eq. (A12) with the restriction
(A13) for a fixed ppass takes its minimum for δ0 = δ1 = δ.
The minimum is equal to the right-hand side of inequal-
ity (23), and equality (24) takes place. Hence, inequality
(23) is a necessary condition for the existence of a positive
semi-definite operator ρAB satisfying Eq. (19).
Consider the following operator:
ρAB =
1−Qz
2
 1 + δ 0 0 1− 2Qx0 0 0 00 0 0 0
1− 2Qx 0 0 1− δ

+
Qz
2
0 0 0 00 1− δ 1− 2Qx 00 1− 2Qx 1 + δ 0
0 0 0 0
 . (A14)
If inequality (23) is satisfied, then this operator is positive
semi-definite and satisfies Eq. (19) (for t = 1). This
proves the sufficiency of condition (23) for the existence
of a solution. As we will see, (A14) is an optimal solution.
Recall that we consider G(ρAB) to be defined only on
the registers AB. Then,
G(ρAB) =
1−Qz
2

1 + δ 0 0 (1− 2Qx)√η
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
(1 − 2Qx)√η 0 0 (1− δ)η

+
Qz
2

0 0 0 0
0 (1− δ)η (1− 2Qx)√η 0
0 (1− 2Qx)√η 1 + δ 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
(A15)
and Z(G(ρAB)) is the diagonal part of G(ρAB). The
eigenvalues of G(ρAB) are:
λ1,2 = (1 −Qz)λ±, λ3,4 = Qzλ±, (A16)
where λ− = ppassλ(Qx, η, t, ppass) (see Eq. (26)) and
λ+ = ppass − λ−. Then the straightforward calculation
of Eq. (13) yields Eq. (25).
2. The proof of optimality of ρAB. We have ob-
tained the desired formula (25). It remains to show that
ρAB is optimal. We will show that the gradient ∇f(ρAB)
is orthogonal to all allowable directions of movement
away from ρAB. This will mean that ρAB provides an
optimal value to (15a).
Let inequality (23) be satisfied as a strict inequality.
In this case, operator (A14) is nondegenerate and the
gradient, as we concluded above, is well defined. The
case when inequality (23) is satisfied as an equality can
be obtained as a limiting case. The continuity of the
objective function in ρAB is proved in Ref. [11].
Consider the eigenvectors (cos θ, sin θ) and
(− sin θ, cos θ), θ = 12 arctan
2
√
η(1−2Qx)
1−η+δ(1+η) , of the ma-
trix (
1 + δ (1− 2Qx)√η
(1− 2Qx)√η (1− δ)η
)
(A17)
corresponding to the eigenvalues 2λ±. Then the direct
calculation according to Eqs. (A2) and (A6) gives
∇f(ρAB) =

d0 0 0 0
0 ηd1 0 0
0 0 d0 0
0 0 0 ηd1

+
√
η sin θ cos θ log
λ+
λ−

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 , (A18)
where
d0 = cos
2 θ logλ+ + sin
2 θ logλ−, (A19a)
d1 = sin
2 θ log λ+ + cos
2 θ logλ− − log η. (A19b)
We see that the gradient is orthogonal to all direc-
tions except the changes in the diagonal of ρAB and
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directions that change the sum of the secondary diag-
onal. However, the sum of the secondary diagonal is
fixed by the restrictions Γ1 and Γ2. According to the re-
strictions Γ1 and Γ3, the allowable directions of changes
in the diagonal (∆ρ00,∆ρ01,∆ρ10,∆ρ11) satisfy the rela-
tions ∆ρ00 = −∆ρ10 and ∆ρ01 = −∆ρ11. Hence,
Tr∇f(ρAB) diag(∆ρ00, . . . ,∆ρ11)
= d0(∆ρ00 +∆ρ10) + ηd1(∆ρ01 +∆ρ11) = 0, (A20)
and the gradient is thus orthogonal to all allowable di-
rections. This means that ρAB provides a minimum to
the secret key rate (15a) for the case of two-dimensional
Bob’s space.
3. The case of three-dimensional Bob’s space.
Now we return to the case of three-dimensional Bob’s
space and arbitrary t ≤ 1. Since t is a common factor in
all restrictions (19), if we multiply the right-hand side of
Eq. (A14) by t, then the restrictions will be satisfied for
this value of t. We can also see the vacuum component of
ρAB does not contribute directly (i.e., besides the factor
t) either to the secret key rate nor to the gradient [see
Eqs. (A2) and (A6)] or to the restrictions. So, the state
tρAB⊕0+(1− t)I2/2⊗|vac〉 〈vac|, where ρAB is a matrix
defined by Eq. (A14) on the four-dimensional subspace
and ⊕0 denotes its embedding into the six-dimensional
space HA ⊗HB = C2 ⊗ C3, is an optimal state and the
secret key is given by Eq. (25). In other words, the use
of the vacuum component and transmission loss do not
give an advantage to Eve: Her knowledge per sifted key
bit remains the same.
Remark 6. In Remark 3, we promised to show that the
inclusion of additional restrictions does not change the so-
lution of the optimization problem provided that the nat-
ural noise in the channel is described by the depolarizing
channel (20) and (21). Indeed, let us consider the max-
imal set of restrictions {Γjk} (see the beginning of Re-
mark 3) and the corresponding values γjk = TrΓjkρ
0
AB,
where ρ0AB is given by Eq. (21). Then it is straight-
forward to show that ρAB with δ = 0 satisfies all the
restrictions, i.e., Tr ΓjkρAB = γjk. In other words, ρAB
is a feasible solution. It is also an optimal one: If the
gradient (A18) is orthogonal to all directions of move-
ment allowed by a certain set of the restrictions, then it
is also orthogonal to all directions of movement allowed
by a larger set of restrictions.
In this reasoning, we considered the case δ = 0 because
this is true whenever the natural noise is described by the
depolarizing channel. As we noted after Corollary 1, a
non-zero δ may be caused by statistical fluctuations. So,
analysis of a non-zero δ is necessary for the development
of a finite-key analysis, but it can be set to zero if we are
interested in the asymptotic secret key rate.
Then we can consider the following problem: What is a
minimal set of restrictions that do not decrease the opti-
mal value of the objective function? Our set {Γ1,Γ2,Γ3}
is such a choice. The matrices of these operators have
simple forms and are directly related to the expression of
the gradient ∇f(ρAB).
APPENDIX B. INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN
THE ERROR CORRECTION FOR THE CASE OF
DETECTION-EFFICIENCY MISMATCH
Our aim is to calculate the quantity H(A|BA˜B˜)ρ(4)
in Eq. (12). Since the registers AB are the copies of
AB and the registers A˜B˜ store the fixed value z in ρ(4)
(see the beginning of Appendix A for details), we can
consider ρ(4) to be defined only on the two registersA and
B: ρ
(4)
AB. Further, H(A|B)ρ(4) is a classical conditional
entropy with the two binary random variables A and B.
It is well known to be upper bounded by h(Qz), where
Qz is the probability of error (A 6= B).
However, in our case, for ρAB given by Eq. (A14),
which corresponds to an optimal Eve’s attack, H(A|B)
is exactly h(Qz) whenever δ = 0. Indeed the diagonal
part of ρAB takes the form t(1 − Qz, Qz, Qz, 1 − Qz)/2
in this case (the order of the values of the registers is
the same as in Appendix A: AB = 00, 01, 10, 11). Fur-
ther, ρ
(4)
AB = ppassG(ρAB). The diagonal part of ρ(4)AB is
then (1 − Qz, Qzη,Qz, (1 − Qz)η)/(1 + η). This is the
joint distribution of A. It is straightforward to show that
H(A|B) = h(Qz). So, the state ρAB simultaneously min-
imizes the first term in the right-hand side of Eq. (12) and
maximizes the second term there. Thus, it minimizes the
whole expression (12). Hence, we can substitute the sec-
ond term by its maximal value h(Qz) without loss of
tightness of the bound.
If δ 6= 0, then, strictly speaking, H(A|B) is smaller
than h(Qz). However, in this paper we assume that a
non-zero value of δ is caused by the statistical fluctua-
tions or by Eve’s interference of the same order (see the
discussion after Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) and, hence, δ
is infinitesimal in the limit n→∞. Hence, the difference
between H(A|B) and h(Qz) is also infinitesimal.
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